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Abstract  
 
This paper investigates whether the number of trips by a country's leader to the United States 
allows the country to adopt a more democratic system of governance and to embrace better 
democratic practices. To achieve its objective, the paper uses a novel variable that indicates 
the number of trips by a leader or a head of a government to the United States of America 
from 1960-2015. The baseline results show that the number of leaders’ trips to the United 
States has a statistically significant positive coefficient, which provides evidence that these 
foreign trips are positively associated with democratic governance. These results are robust 
even after the inclusion of several control variables identified by the literature as confounding 
factors of democracy, and after controlling for outliers. 
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"It is the policy of the United States to seek and 
support the growth of democratic movements and 
institutions in every nation and culture, with the 
ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world." 
George W. Bush in his inaugural address after his 
swearing-in ceremony of 2005. 
1. Introduction 
This paper examines the effect of the number of trips by the leader of a country or the 
head of a government to the United States on democratic governance in their home country. 
To be specific, we investigate whether foreign travel by a country's leader to the United States 
allows the country to adopt a more democratic system of governance and to embrace better 
democratic practices. This is the first attempt in the literature to consider the number of trips 
by heads of state as a determinant of democracy. 
In this context, we focus on the United States since American foreign policy typically 
swings between two approaches. The first is to stand for the promotion of democracy, 
political freedoms, and human rights. The second is to safeguard American strategic interests 
even if it entails fostering alliances with totalitarian regimes.  
This dichotomy implies that, on one hand, there is an ideological position that considers 
democracy promotion in the core of a national security doctrine. Accordingly, some American 
administrations elevate democratic imperatives, and voice concern whenever they encounter 
serious violations to democratic practices or human rights. These Administrations attempt to 
pressure governments to embrace democratic systems of governance through the carrot of 
foreign aid or debt relief or the stick of sanctions, censure or isolation. One of the adopted 
ways to cajole countries into democratic transition is to persuade or to pressure leaders of 
these countries during their official visits to the United States. This is because power in non-
democratic countries is usually centered around the person of the leader. Thus, such transition 
can only be undertaken after the approval of the leadership of the country, which can be 
obtained during their visit by enticement or coercion. In this context, we expect that the 
number of leader’s trips to the United States to have a positive effect on democratic 
governance.  
On the other hand, American foreign policy has another pragmatic approach aimed at 
achieving strategic objectives and ensuring economic interests without being preoccupied 
with what type of government delivers. This approach is willing to overlook non-democratic 
behavior as long as other practices are conducive to achieving these foreign policy goals. In 
this case, intervention for democracy is used only as a pretext for pressure on other more 
expedient issues to the United States. In this context, the leaders may be emboldened to 
continue with their autocratic practices as long as they perceive themselves indispensable 
strategically to the United States, which they can guarantee during their visits. Thus, we 
expect that the leader’s trips to have an adverse effect on democracy. 
Given that the effect of the number of leaders’ foreign trips on democracy is 
inconclusive, an empirical analysis is warranted. To achieve its objective, the paper uses a 
novel variable that indicates the number of trips by a leader or a head of a government to the 
United States of America from 1960-2015, which is derived from the archives of the U.S. 
Department of State. The baseline results show that the number of leaders’ trips to the United 
States has a statistically significant positive coefficient, which provides evidence that these 
foreign trips are positively associated with democratic governance, measured by the fraction 
of years under democracy or by democratic capital. These results are robust even after the 
inclusion of several control variables identified by the literature as confounding factors of 
democracy, and after controlling for outliers.  
We do not expect endogeneity to be an issue in this case because democracy, or the lack 
thereof, is not expected to have an effect on the number of leader’s visits to the United States. 
Leaders of all sorts usually have the desire to visit the United States to plead for economic 
assistance, to request military supplies, to ask for diplomatic support, to earn the approval of 
the administration, to have the backing of the super power, and to strengthen bilateral ties. 
Those visits are usually crucial for leaders of countries with dire economic needs, those 
embroiled in conflict, or those who need to discuss bilateral or multilateral issues. Thus, we 
do not expect the form of government to have an effect on the number of leader’s trips to the 
United States. 
This paper’s contribution to the literature is twofold. The paper is the first attempt to 
examine the effect of foreign travel by heads of state on democracy. The second contribution 
is that it is also the first to highlight the political consequences of a country's leader's trips 
abroad.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 discusses the literature 
survey, section 3 includes the detailed description of the data, section 4 includes the empirical 
estimation and the robustness tests, and section 5 concludes. References, tables and figures 
are included thereafter. 
2. Literature 
This paper contributes to a new burgeoning literature on the determinants of democracy, 
that follows the seminal work in Barro (1999). The studies in this literature specifically focus 
on the political outcomes of the background of the country’s leadership, in addition to the 
foreign experiences by the people and the leaders of the country. These experiences include 
foreign education or living abroad. Our paper contributes to the literature by considering the 
effect of foreign travel by the leader of the country on democracy.  
Some studies show that there is an association between a leader’s educational 
background and democracy. For instance, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) use a data set on 
over 1,400 world leaders to show that democracies are almost 20% more likely to select 
highly educated leaders. Mercier (2016) explores the relationship between political leaders' 
foreign education and the evolution of democracy during their leadership. The author shows a 
positive correlation between the fact that leaders studied abroad, especially in high-income 
OECD countries, and the change in democracy during their tenure. Gift and Krcmaric (2017) 
show that leaders educated at Western universities significantly and substantively improve a 
country’s democratic prospects. Spilimbergo (2009) shows that foreign-educated individuals 
foster democracy in their home country, only if the education is attained in democratic 
countries. This obviously applies to a country’s leadership as well. Leader’s foreign education 
is also shown to affect a country’s foreign policy. For instance, Dreher and Yu (2016) study 
whether leaders' foreign education influences their voting behavior at the United Nations 
General Assembly. The authors find that foreign-educated leaders are less likely to vote in 
line with their host countries but more likely to vote in line with other G7 countries.  
There is also another stream of literature that focuses on the effect of foreign 
experiences of leaders or individuals, who lived abroad, on democracy in their home 
countries. This is because migrants may transmit to their home communities the political 
ideas and practices they absorbed while living abroad. These political spillovers have the 
potential to change political preferences and to increase the support for political change. 
For instance, Chauvet and Mercier (2014) explore the connection between return 
migrants and political outcomes in their home country, using the case of Mali. The authors 
find a positive effect of return migrants, from non-African countries, on participation rates 
and on electoral competitiveness. The authors also provide evidence of a diffusion of political 
norms from these returnees to non-migrants. Batista et al. (2018) explore the role of migrants 
in shaping political attitudes in sending countries, with a focus on Mozambique. Their  
analysis  shows  that  the  number  of  migrants  an  individual  is  in  close  contact with 
through chatting significantly increases political participation in that area. Batista and Vicente 
(2011) conduct an experiment to examine whether migration increases the demand for 
political accountability in the country of origin. The authors find a positive effect which is 
stronger for migration to countries with better governance, and for return migrants than for 
current ones. Docquier et al. (2016) use cross-sectional and panel estimations for a large 
sample of developing countries, and find that openness to emigration has a positive effect on 
home-country democratization. 
Karadja and Prawitz (2019) study the political effects of the mass emigration to the 
United States in the nineteenth century using data from Sweden. Their estimates show that 
emigration substantially increased the likelihood of adopting more inclusive political 
institutions, and increasing the demand for political change captured by labor movement 
membership, strike participation, and voting. Barsbai et al. (2017) show that the wave of 
emigration in the aftermath of the Russian crisis of 1998 affected electoral outcomes and 
political preferences in Moldova. The authors document a significant negative effect of 
emigration to the West on the share of votes for the Communist Party in the elections of 
2009–2010.  
Our paper contributes to this literature by arguing that if the experience of living abroad 
by citizens affects the political outcomes in the home country, it is more likely that the 
experience of official travelling abroad by leaders will have more of an effect on democracy.  
3. Data  
The countries included in the analysis are Taiwan, Canada, Liberia, Rwanda, Thailand, 
Czech Republic, Niger, Belize, USA, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Costa Rica,  
Malta, Ethiopia, Lao PDR, Libya, China, Turkey, Mongolia, Latvia, Guatemala, Uruguay, 
Republic of Moldova, Tajikistan, Saudi Arabia, Greece, Burundi, Tanzania, Portugal, Malawi, 
Netherlands, Antigua and Barbuda, Macao, Gabon, Nigeria, Cuba, Swaziland, Tunisia, 
Bermuda, Mozambique, Oman, Bhutan, Nepal, Georgia, Angola, Armenia, Mali, Denmark, 
Burkina Faso, Papua New Guinea, Venezuela, Uganda, Comoros, Syria, Lebanon, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Equatorial Guinea, Pakistan, Brunei, Kuwait, Algeria, Congo, Bangladesh, 
Mauritius, Eritrea, Honduras, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Haiti, Suriname, Benin, 
Germany, Norway, Lesotho, Central African Republic, Bahamas, Azerbaijan, Sao Tome and 
Principe, Singapore, Yemen, Fiji, Korea, Timor-Leste, Colombia, Albania, Djibouti,  
Nicaragua, Belarus, Jamaica, Madagascar, Brazil, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ireland, 
Iran, France, Egypt, Turkmenistan, Mexico, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Peru, Vietnam, Zimbabwe, 
New Zealand, Bahrain, Gambia, Zambia, El Salvador, Ukraine, Spain, Croatia, Iraq, Grenada, 
Jordan, Kenya, Cote d'Ivoire, Hong Kong, Russia, Belgium, Micronesia, Guinea-Bissau, 
Iceland, Dominica, Qatar, Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, Indonesia, Macedonia, Austria, 
Lithuania, Chad, Afghanistan, Slovenia, Tonga, Cameroon, Chile, Poland, Cyprus, Argentina, 
Singapore, Romania, Sudan, Israel, Philippines, Ecuador, Barbados, Panama, Palau, Somalia, 
Seychelles, St. Lucia, Finland, Estonia, Cape Verde,  Paraguay, Vanuatu, United Kingdom, 
Australia, Italy, Montenegro, Kazakhstan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Guatemala, Guinea, Japan. 
Table 1 presents the data source and description of all the variables used in this study. Table 2 
presents the descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis.  
The dependent variable in our analysis is democracy. We use two measures of 
democratic governance during the period understudy. The first is the fraction of years under 
democracy derived from Ashraf et al. (forthcoming). The second is democratic capital derived 
from Persson and Tabellini (2009) which captures a nation’s historical experience with 
democracy. These two estimates of democracy are discussed in details in these papers. 
The variable of interest is leaders' trips, which is calculated as the number of trips by the 
country's leader to the United States of America during the period 1960-2015. This data is 
derived from the Office of the Historian, which is affiliated to the Department of Sate of the 
United States of America.1 Figure 1 shows a world map of leader’s trips to the United States 
during the period 1960-2015. To the best of our knowledge, this variable has never been used 
before in the literature. To collect this variable, we use historical data from the Department of 
State of the United States of America. We counted the number of leaders' trips to the U.S.A. 
from 1960 to 2015. Initially, the objective was to use the total number of leaders’ trips to all 
countries. However, instead of considering all destination countries we only consider leaders’ 
                                                          
1 https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory. 
trips to the country whose foreign policy focuses on democracy promotion more than any 
other country. This fact can justify our focus on trips by leaders to the United States.  
4. Estimation 
This section conducts an empirical estimation of the effect of the number of leaders’ 
trips to the United States of America on democracy in their country during the period 1960-
2015. Figure 2 shows a positive association between leader’s trips and the two measures of 
democracy. To explore this relationship we use the following equation 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 = 𝜃𝜃 + 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖𝑖 + ℵ𝑖𝑖𝛾𝛾 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 (1) 
Where Democracyi is either the fraction of years under democracy, or the democratic 
capital in country i. LeadersTripsi is the number of trips by the leader of country i to the 
United States. ℵi is a vector of control variables and μi is the error term. The vector of control 
variables includes those commonly identified in the literature as determinants of democracy. 
Thus, we control for income per capita, educational attainment, legal origin, continental and 
religion dummies, fractionalization, and natural endowments. The study is a cross-country 
analysis and applies the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) estimation technique. The choice of 
this technique is dictated by our variable of interest, which is only available in cross-section. 
4.1.  Baseline Results 
The baseline results are included in table 3. Column 1 includes the coefficient of the 
number of leader’s trips without any control variables, column 2 adds a dummy for 
predominantly Muslim countries, column 3 adds the logarithm of GDP per capita, column 4 
adds a dummy for oil or gas discovery, column 5 adds the continental dummies, column 6 
adds legal origins, and column 7 adds all the control variables where the dependent variable is 
democratic capital.  
The OLS estimation shows that the number of leaders' trips has a statistically significant 
positive coefficient in all specifications. This implies that a higher number of foreign trips by 
the head of state is associated with a higher level of democratic governance during the period 
of interest. When we include all the control variables, the leaders' trips variable has a 
significant coefficient of 0.008. This implies that a one standard deviation increase in the 
number of leaders' trips to the United States translates into an increase in the measure for 
democracy by 0.1432. 
We include a Muslim dummy as some studies find that countries with Muslim 
majorities enjoy less freedom and are less democratic than countries in which Muslims are a 
minority, as in Potrafke (2012). The results show that the Muslim dummy is not significant in 
the case when we use the fraction of years under democracy as our dependent variable, but 
has a statistically significant negative coefficient when we use democratic capital. We also 
include the logarithm of GDP per capita. The central tenet of the modernization theory is that 
higher income per capita causes a country to be more democratic. Lipset (1959) suggested 
that the process of modernization involved changes in “the factors of industrialization, 
urbanization, wealth, and education [which] are so closely interrelated as to form one 
common factor. And the factors subsumed under economic development carry with it the 
political correlate of democracy” (p. 80). The results are consistent with this view and show 
that the logarithm of GDP per capita has a statistically significant positive coefficient in all 
specifications. This contradicts the previous results (e.g. Acemoglu, et al., 2008; Jha and 
Kodila-Tedika 2019). 
We also add a dummy for gas or oil discovery. There are some studies which show a 
connection between oil abundance and the system of governance. Kevin Tsui (2011) finds 
that discovering 100 billion barrels of oil pushes a country’s democracy level almost 20 
percentage points below trend after three decades. Our results show that the coefficient is 
negative but not statistically significant. Finally, the results of the last column also show that 
the British and French legal traditions have a positive significant effect on democratic capital. 
4.2.  Controlling for Outliers 
The OLS estimates could be affected by the influence of a certain number of influential 
observations, or outliers. Our first sensitivity check estimates our baseline specification, with 
our full set of control variables, after dropping the ten countries with the largest number of 
leaders’ trips. The results are presented in column 1 of table 4. The coefficient of the number 
of leader’s trips is positive and significant. However, this technique is generically weak and 
more robust estimations are warranted.  
Considering this issue, we apply Hubert’s Iteratively Weighted Least Squares IWLS as 
in Huber (1964, 1973) and Li (1985). This technique is used to mitigate the influence of 
outliers in an otherwise normally distributed data set. We omit all observations for which 
|DFBETAi| > 2/√N, where N is the number of observations. The results are presented in 
column 2 of table 4. The coefficient of interest is positive and statistically significant. We also 
use the Hadi (1992) procedure to detect and control for outliers. The results of the estimation 
after correcting for the presence of outliers are shown in column 3 of table 4. These different 
corrections do not affect the results found so far. The coefficient of the leaders’ trips remains 
positive and statistically significant. In different terms, the outliers have no real impact on the 
direction, sign or significance of the relationship of interest. 
4.3. Model Uncertainty 
In Table 5, we account for model uncertainty. Consistent with Young (2009), Young 
and Kroeger (2017) and Asongu and Kodila-Tedika (2018), econometric models are always 
associated with some degree of uncertainty. We follow the technique developed in Young et 
al. (2013) who maintain that “This program facilitates robustness tests that are more rigorous, 
transparent, and informative. It takes a regression model and tests the robustness of a 
coefficient of interest with respect to the choice of controls. The program estimates all 
possible combinations of control variables, and reports key statistics on the resulting 
distribution of estimates.” (p.2) 
  This framework allows us to address one of the concerns in empirical social science, 
which is the sensitivity of empirical findings to credible variations in model specification, as 
argued in Young (2009), and Young and Kroeger (2017) who state that this is a “framework 
for model that can demonstrate robustness across sets of possible controls, variable 
definitions, standard errors, and functional forms. We estimate all possible combinations of 
specified model ingredients, report key statistics on the modeling distribution of estimates, 
and identify the model details that are empirically most influential” (p. 4). Our findings using 
this framework are disclosed in Table 5. 
As shown in table 5, 4096 unique combinations of control variables were generated by the 
program. Moreover, the program ran each of those models using OLS and storing the 
estimates from each model. It is established that the estimated coefficient of the leader’s trips 
is positive and significant (sign stability: 100%, significance rate: 100%, positive and 
significance: 100%). The average estimate across all of these models is 0.0093. Given the 
total standard error of 0.0028, the robustness student test statistic is 3.3652. 
4.3.  Alternative Controls 
In this section, we include alternative drivers of democracy to our estimation. This is also 
to check the robustness of our results. In table 6, we include educational attainment, measured 
by the average years of schooling amongst the population aged 25 and over. In column 1 of 
table 6, we test the modernization hypothesis that a high level of human capital allows 
democracy to consolidate. There are also studies that show that education fosters political 
participation. Glaeser et al. (2007) show that schooling increase the incentives for civic 
engagement and ensure a broader participation in the political process. Campante and Chor 
(2012) argue that "more educated citizens display a greater propensity to engage in virtually 
all forms of political activity, including voting, attending political events, staying informed 
about politics, working on campaigns, contributing money, and signing petitions." Column 1 
of table 6 shows that the number of leader’s trips is statistically significant and positive. 
Schooling, however, does not have a significant coefficient, while economic growth shows a 
statistically negative effect. 
In column 2 of table 6 we add ethnic and religious fractionalization. In highly diverse 
societies, the group that dominates power tend to expropriate resources from the other groups 
and restrict the rights of the members of the other groups. Therefore, we expect that 
fractionalization would have an adverse effect on democratic governance. Jensen and 
Skaaning (2011) show that at with high levels of ethnic fractionalization, the positive effect of 
modernization decreases. Gerring et al. (2018) show that ethno-linguistic diversity increases 
prospects for democracy, while religious diversity decreases these prospects. Column 2 
confirms the statistically significant positive effect of the number of leader’s trips, while the 
coefficients of the two types of fractionalization are insignificant. 
In column 4 of table 6, we include a Catholic and Protestant dummies. Some studies, 
as in Bruce (2004), argue that Protestantism, compared to Catholicism, has been linked to 
generating a political culture that promotes individualism, engagement and civic association. 
The results confirm our previous finding for the sign and significance of the number of 
leader’s trips, but shows that the coefficients of these dummies are insignificant with a 
positive sign for the Catholic dummy and a negative one for the Protestant dummy. 
In the last column, we include all control variables and confirm the robustness of our 
results that show that the number of leader’s trips to the United States has a significant 
positive association with democracy. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper investigates whether the number of trips by a country's leader to the United 
States allows the country to adopt a more democratic system of governance and to embrace 
better democratic practices. To achieve its objective, the paper uses a novel variable that 
indicates the number of trips by a leader or a head of a government to the United States of 
America from 1960-2015. The baseline results show that the number of leaders’ trips to the 
United States has a statistically significant positive coefficient, which provides evidence that 
these foreign trips are positively associated with democratic governance. These results are 
robust even after the inclusion of several control variables identified by the literature as 
confounding factors of democracy, and after controlling for outliers. 
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Table 1. Data Definitions and Sources  
Variables Definitions Sources 
Domestic Democratic 
Capital 
A country’s historical experience with democracy Persson, and Tabellini (2009) 
School  Average years of schooling amongst the 
population aged 25 and over 
Barro and Lee (2010). 
Leaders' trips to USA 
Number of trips by heads of governments or state 
leaders to the USA during the period 1960-2015. 
https://history.state.gov/departm
enthistory 
GDP growth (annual 
%) 
Annual growth rate of real GDP per capita 1960-
2015. 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Fractionalization Ethnic, religious, and linguistic fractionalization. Alesina et al. (2003) 
Fraction of years under 
democracy 
 Ashraf et al. 
Oil or gas discovery  Ashraf et al. 
Log of GDP per capita GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international 
$) 1960-2015. 
World Bank WDI online 
Database 
Africa Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Africa and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
Asia Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Asia and 0 otherwise 
Own Calculation 
America Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a America and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
Oceania Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Oceania and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
Europe Dummy variables that take on the value of one 
when a country belongs to a Europe and 0 
otherwise 
Own Calculation 
English legal origin 
 
Dummy indicating a country's legal system based 
on the English common law.  
Djankov et. al. (2007) 
French legal origin 
 
Dummy indicating a country's legal system based 
on the French civil law.  
Djankov et. al. (2007) 
German legal origin 
 
Dummy indicating a country's legal system based 
on German civil law.  
Djankov et. al. (2007) 
Scandinavian legal 
origin 
 
Dummy indicating a country's legal system based 
on Scandinavian legal system.  
Djankov et. al. (2007) 
Socialist legal origin 
 
Dummy indicating a country's legal system is 
Socialist.  
Djankov et. al. (2007) 
Muslim 
 
Dummy indicating the main religion in the 
country is Islam.  
La Porta et. al. (1999).  
Catholic 
 
Dummy indicating the main religion in the 
country is Catholicism.  
La Porta et. al. (1999).  
Protestant  
 
Dummy indicating the main religion in the 
country is Protestantism.  
La Porta et. al. (1999).  
 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics  
Variables Obs Mean     Std. Dev.        Min         Max 
Domestic Democratic 
Capital 
147     .1885173     .2292014          0 .8037082 
School  91     7.533427     2.874246     1.0188     13.004 
Leaders' trips to USA 149     16.31544     17.90217          0 111 
GDP growth (annual %) 149     4.002485     2.126755   -1.49013    16.49753 
Ethnic Fractionalization 100     .4184353     .2813748     .009962     .958587 
Fraction of years under 
democracy 
149     .3921772     .3776692          0 1 
Oil or gas discovery 149     .6577181     .4760736          0 1 
Log of GDP per capita 146      8.8952     1.239154    6.458339    11.67319 
Africa 141     .2553191     .437595     0 1 
Asia 141     .2695035     .4452837          0 1 
America 141     .1489362     .3572948          0 1 
Religios  Fractionalization 100     .2866467     .2384374    .0005998    .7822098 
Europe 141     .248227     .4335242          0 1 
English legal origin 102     .2745098     .4484707          0 1 
French legal origin 102     .4509804     .5000485          0 1 
German legal origin 102     .0490196     .2169752          0 1 
Scandinavian legal origin 102     .0294118     .1697921          0 1 
Socialist legal origin 102     .1960784     .3989892          0 1 
Muslim 142     .1901408     .3938012          0 1 
Catholic 142     .3396226     .475831     0 1 
Protestant  142     .1226415     .3295836          0 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3. Baseline Results 
 
Fraction of years under democracy 
Domestic 
Democratic 
Capital 
Leaders' trip to USA 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.008*** 0.004** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Musilm dummy 
 
0.014 0.026 0.029 0.025 0.024 -0.092* 
  
(0.077) (0.075) (0.077) (0.093) (0.138) (0.051) 
GDP per capita 
  
0.111*** 0.117*** 0.107*** 0.106*** 0.079*** 
   
(0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.037) (0.022) 
Oil or gas discovery 
   
-0.068 -0.049 -0.060 -0.024 
    
(0.060) (0.063) (0.080) (0.040) 
Asia 
    
-0.184* 0.004 0.074 
     
(0.109) (0.168) (0.100) 
Americas 
    
-0.238** -0.155 -0.041 
     
(0.099) (0.150) (0.085) 
Africa 
    
-0.187* -0.095 -0.064 
     
(0.102) (0.160) (0.083) 
Europe 
    
-0.207** -0.042 0.045 
     
(0.090) (0.156) (0.098) 
legor_uk 
     
0.239 0.209* 
      
(0.219) (0.119) 
legor_fr 
     
0.294 0.277** 
      
(0.219) (0.117) 
legor_so 
     
0.129 0.150 
      
(0.217) (0.116) 
legor_sc 
     
0.094 0.091 
      
(0.224) (0.123) 
_cons 0.244*** 0.250*** 
-
0.681*** 
-
0.692*** 
-0.428 -0.790* -0.761*** 
 
(0.037) (0.039) (0.221) (0.224) (0.276) (0.406) (0.245) 
Number of observations 149 142 139 139 138 99 99 
R2 0.186 0.182 0.286 0.292 0.317 0.334 0.441 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
        
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4. Controlling for Outliers 
 
Omit 10 countries 
with most Leaders' 
trips 
Omit if 
|DFBETA| > 
2/√𝑵𝑵 Hadi (1992) 
Leaders' trip to USA 0.008*** 0.012*** 0.009** 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Muslim dummy 0.021 -0.010 0.022 
 
(0.137) (0.146) (0.137) 
GDP per capita (log) 0.107*** 0.078* 0.099** 
 
(0.038) (0.042) (0.040) 
Oil or gas discovery -0.051 -0.072 -0.036 
 
(0.083) (0.080) (0.082) 
Legal origin Yes Yes Yes 
Continental effect Yes Yes Yes 
_cons -0.643* -0.395 -0.644* 
 
(0.370) (0.518) (0.328) 
Number of observations 96 88 92 
R2 0.324 0.377 0.275 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 5. Model Uncertainty and Robustness 
Variable of interest Leaders Trip to USA  
Outcome variable Democracy  Observations  99 
Possible control terms 12    Mean R2 0.26 
Multicollinearity 0.26 
Number of models 4.096  Conventional Significance Testing: 
Model Robustness Statistics:  Sign Stability 100% 
Mean(b) 0.0093  Significance rate 100% 
Sampling SE 0.0023  Positive 100% 
Modeling SE 0.0015  Positive and Sig 100% 
Total SE 0.0028  Negative 0% 
Robustness Ratio 3.3652  Negative and Sig 0% 
Model Influence   
 Marginal Effect of Variable 
Inclusion 
Percent Change From Mean(b) 
GDP per capita (log) -0.0028 -30.2% 
legor_ge 0.0005 5.3% 
Asia  -0.0002 -2.4% 
legor_uk   0.0002 2.2% 
Oil or gas discovery 0.0002 2.2% 
legor_fr 0.0002 1.6% 
mus 0.0001 1.6% 
Africa  -0.0001 -1.5% 
legor_so 0.0001 1.0% 
Americas -0.0001 -0.8% 
legor_sc 0.0001 0.6% 
Europa -0.0000 -0.2% 
   
Constant 0.0102  
R-squared 0.9837  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6. Additional Controls 
 
Modernization 
Hypothesis 
Fractionalization  Religion All controls 
Leaders' trip to USA 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
School  -0.024 
  
-0.029 
 
(0.017) 
  
(0.026) 
GDP growth (annual %) -0.055*** 
  
-0.062*** 
 
(0.016) 
  
(0.018) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
 
0.124 
 
0.136 
  
(0.166) 
 
(0.180) 
Religious fractionalization 
 
-0.154 
 
0.057 
  
(0.257) 
 
(0.284) 
Catholic dymmy 
  
0.014 -0.046 
   
(0.117) (0.179) 
Protestant dummy 
  
-0.080 0.034 
   
(0.199) (0.238) 
Cons -0.458 -0.623 -0.634 -0.405 
 
(0.382) (0.386) (0.450) (0.460) 
Number of observations 89 78 85 63 
R2 0.454 0.403 0.330 0.547 
note:  .01 - ***; .05 - **; .1 - *; 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1. World Map of Leader’s Trips 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 2. Leader’s Trips and Democracy 
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